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Flight-to-quality and contagion in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis:  
The cases of Portugal and Greece1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This work aims to analyze the co-movements between the Portuguese, Greek, Irish and German 
government bond markets after the subprime crisis (2007 to 2013). Additionally, it aims to test the 
existence of contagion between the Portuguese, Greece and Irish bond markets, and to explore the 
phenomenon of flight-to-quality from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German market. 
The analysis is undertaken using a DCC-IGARCH model with daily data for the 10 year yields 
government bonds. Results suggest the existence of contagion between the Greek and the Portuguese 
markets, and to a lesser extent between the Irish and the Portuguese markets. The correlation 
between the Portuguese and Greek yields at the end of the analyzed period indicates the non-
existence of decoupling between the two countries. During most of the identified crisis periods, 
flight-to-quality flows are evident from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German 
market. 
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1 We thank Sandro Martins, Sofia Vale, and Andreia Ferreira for their comments.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Greece has been blamed for triggering a contagion effect that started the Eurozone crisis. In this 
context, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between the bond markets of those countries 
most affected by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, which also  requested external financial 
assistance (Portugal, Greece and Ireland), from January 2007 to March 2013. 
It is important to understand whether for these peripheral countries public debt costs grew 
due to increased credit risk or due to the existence of contagion, since this has implications on the 
adequate policy measures to undertake. The existence of contagion calls for an European 
institutional response to support countries in financial stress by providing liquidity and avoid the 
spread of problems to other countries.  The study of contagion is also relevant for financial investors, 
because it reduces the advantages of international risk diversification, with implications for risk 
management.  
We complement the works of Missio and Watzka (2011) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas 
(2012) which conclude that contagion from Greece to various countries of the euro area, including 
Portugal, took place. 
This paper has three main goals. Firstly, it aims to determine if there was evidence of 
contagion between Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Secondly, the study aims to ascertain the existence 
of flight-to-quality capital flows from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German bond 
market during crisis periods. Thirdly, being Ireland, a country considered among market participants 
better off than Greece and Portugal, it will also be possible to test if the Portuguese bond market is 
approaching the Irish, as some market news suggested (Economic Daily 2012, 2013) or if on the 
contrary, it remains highly correlated with the Greek bond market. 
We use daily data for 10 year maturity yields of government bonds. The methodology is 
based on a model DCC-IGARCH (Dynamic Conditional Correlation - Integrated Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional heteroskedasticity) to obtain dynamic correlations between pairs of 
yields. 
This paper presents the following contributions to the literature. Firstly, it combines the 
methodology DCC-IGARCH with the identification of several crises periods, attempting to assess 
the existence of contagion in those periods. The focus is on particularly strong and short periods of 
market stress, unlike other papers that define a large crisis period, which usually starts in 2009 with 
the disclosure of the huge Greek budget deficit. In addition, this article focuses on the issue of flight-
to-quality in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis.  
Results reveal that there was contagion between the Greek and the Portuguese bond markets in most 
of the crisis periods identified. To a lesser extent, significant contagion between Portugal and Ireland 
was also observed. The sovereign bond market of Portugal does not seem to be decoupling from 
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Greece or coupling with Ireland. In what concerns flight-to-quality, there is evidence of such a 
phenomenon from both Portugal and Greece to Germany in most of the identified crisis periods.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical framework and review of the 
literature on contagion and the public debt crisis in the euro area is presented. In Section 3, we 
expose the hypotheses to be studied, describe the data used and the methodology. In Section 4, we 
introduce the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 5. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we present a review on the literature about the public debt crisis in the Eurozone and 
its origins, as well as studies about financial contagion during the sovereign debt crises. 
 
Sovereign Debt Crisis origin in the Eurozone  
There are several possible reasons for the European Sovereign debt crisis, some more related with 
the way the European Monetary Union (EMU) is designed, others related to country-specific 
situations. Regarding issues related to the monetary union, according to De Grauwe (2011) a national 
bond market in a monetary union is very vulnerable because domestic policy makers do not control 
money issuing, and therefore they are not able to ensure debt holders that they are going to have the 
necessary liquidity to pay them. Contagion between different bond markets could only be stopped if 
a central bank were available to assume the position of lender of last resort. This position was not 
immediately assumed by the ECB.  
According to Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 
contagion can be understood in the context of second generation exchange rate crises models. The 
authors state that by the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, agents believed that the deterioration 
of Greek macroeconomic fundamentals became inconsistent with its permanence within the 
monetary union. The country went from a situation where investors believed in its permanence in the 
euro area, with an implicit guarantee of Treasury bonds by the other countries of the union, to a 
situation where the permanence in the union was not credible and where the implicit guarantee of 
bonds disappeared (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). This lead investors to demand very large 
interest rates and the decision to stay in the euro area became much more costly. However, 
speculation did not play a major role in the increase of interest rates.  
Moreover, with multiple equilibria deriving from the existence of problems in market coordination, 
fundamentals cannot alone explain how a country moves from one equilibrium to another (Pericoli 
and Sbracia, 2003). However, fundamentals can explain why certain countries are more vulnerable to 
crisis than others. 
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The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area highlighted some weaknesses of the EMU, namely the 
large structural differences among member-states, the peripheral economies’ macroeconomic 
disequilibria and the strong correlation between country’s risk and banking risk. According to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), sovereign debt crises usually tend to be preceded by crises in the 
banking system.  
Higgins and Klitgaard (2011) also refer to this weakness of the economies that lost their 
monetary policy autonomy. They claim that the low interest rates available to all countries joining 
the EMU, specifically to the peripheral economies (where interest rates used to be much higher), led 
to an increase in external debt (both of public and private sectors). Before joining the EMU, 
peripheral countries had a weak currency that helped to sustain exports and growth. After the euro 
they lost the option to adjust their own exchange rate, and the challenge was now to control domestic 
expenditure in order to maintain a sustainable growth.  
Higgins and Klitgaard (2011) deepen the specificity of each peripheral country. In both 
Portugal and Greece indebtedness occurred to finance the deterioration of domestic savings, while in 
Spain and Ireland it financed investment in real estate causing a bubble in this sector. Furthermore, 
in Ireland, there were problems related to toxic subprime products, whereas in Portugal, Spain and 
Greece the growth potential did not increase in order to pay for the debt. In Portugal both private and 
public sectors suffered from excess indebtedness, whereas in Greece the problem was more focused 
on the high level of public debt. 
According to Eurostat (Figure 1), even before joining the EMU, Greece already had high 
levels of public debt. After joining the euro, low interest rates and easy access to credit allowed the 
country to continue increasing public indebtedness. On the other hand, Portugal used to have levels 
of public debt lower than 60% (until Q1 2004) and Ireland had a public debt situation even better 
than Portugal.   
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Figure 1 - Public debt as a percentage of GDP, quarterly data. Source: Eurostat, 2013 
 
 
Banking system problems caused by the subprime played a central role in the triggering of the euro 
sovereign debt crisis. During the latter months of 2008, government and central banks’ actions to 
support the financial system intensified, trying to mitigate the effects on the real economy. In 
addition, the crisis reduced tax revenues and increased public expenditure (through fiscal stabilizers 
and accommodative fiscal policy), translating ultimately into an increase in public deficits and debt. 
By the end of 2009, Greece announced its public deficit to be largely higher than previously 
estimated, raising the concern about its public debt sustainability and pressing public debt yields 
higher. This situation ended in   the external joint-intervention of the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund), ECB (European Central Bank) and the European Commission. Quickly the effects of the 
crisis in Greece spread to other countries in the euro area, which were victims of an unprecedented 
crisis of confidence, with speculative attacks on sovereign securities and with successive 
downgrading of their debt, inducing Ireland, Portugal and later Cyprus, to ask for international 
financial aid.   
As shown by Balli (2009), risk perception associated with public bonds of countries joining 
the Eurozone changed dramatically with the sovereign debt crisis. The author proves that after the 
creation of the euro, fiscal and other macroeconomic variables no longer explained yield fluctuation. 
The general belief was that if one country could not honor its commitments, the payment would be 
ensured by the whole EMU, so yields were all close to each other. After the eruption of the sovereign 
debt crisis, the confidence in the monetary union evaporated, with investors reflecting the levels of 
debt and economic indicators of each country on yields (Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). 
Thus, Portugal, Greece and Ireland had high interest rate spreads relative to the German 
public bonds during the euro area sovereign debt crisis (Figure 2). These spreads are essentially 
linked to the credit risk premium, which depends on the level of public debt and on fiscal policies 
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(Hsing, 2010, for Estonia); and on the risk related with recessions and macroeconomic factors 
(Ludvigson and Ng, 2009).   
Spreads started to decrease for Ireland from mid-2011, for Portugal from the beginning of 
2012, and for Greece from mid-2012. The fall of spreads in 2012 is linked to the statement of ECB 
that it would do everything necessary to support the euro (July 2012) and the announcement of the 
readiness to do Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets of euro area sovereign 
bonds (summer 2012) – see ECB, 2010; ECB, 2011; ECB, 2012; ECB, 2013; and ECB, 2014 for a 
description of the monetary policy and bond market situation in 2010-14.  In 2009 the ECB had 
already initiated a programme to buy covered bonds in euros (Covered Bonds Purchase Programme - 
CBPP). This was extended in 2011 (CBPP II), with the main goal of restabilising monetary policy 
transmission in the face of the malfunctioning of markets. Another non-conventional policy was the 
Security Market Programme started in May 2010 directed to buy public and private debt securities.  
Another factor contributing to the decline of spreads was the decision of the ECB in 
December 2011 to follow non-standard monetary policy measures to ensure liquidity to banks: 
conduct longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with a maturity of three years and the increase 
in collateral accepted to lend money to banks. In the first quarter of 2012 these operations were 
initiated with positive effects on the markets. In the same period, there was a private sector swap of 
Greek debt that improved the sustainability of the public debt.  
 Overall, the fall in spreads of the peripheral countries continued in 2013 due to better 
perspectives of economic growth that promoted the search for higher yields, and the re-enforcing of 
the expansionary nature of the ECB policy, both in terms of LTROs and reduction of key interest 
rates (two reductions were operated during this year) - (Banco de Portugal, 2013). In July 2013, the 
ECB declared in its forward guidance that it would maintain interest rates at low levels for a long 
period. The successful end of the financial help to Ireland and Spain also contributed to the reduction 
of spreads in 2013. Portugal and Ireland improved their conditions to a point that would allow future 
access to primary bond markets.  
However, from January to May 2013 uncertainties emerged in the euro area bond market 
with flight-to-quality movements, one of the reasons being the financial assistance program to 
Cyprus.  
In 2014, the successful exit of Portugal from the financial support program contributed to the 
continuation of the decline of its yields and of the ones of peripheral countries, which allowed 
Portugal to regain access to the bond market. The euro area countries which had better 
macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals were the ones that registered the largest decline in yields 
(ECB, 2014).  From June to October 2014, the ECB continued with the decrease in key interest rates 
and with LTROs, started the purchase of selected private sector assets (Asset-Backed Security – 
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ABSPP) and continued the covered bond programme (CBPP III). At the beginning of 2015 the ECB 
decided to also buy securities issued by governments following a policy of quantitative easing, with 
a considerable impact on reducing the yields.  
The ABS programme aims to increase liquidity of banks, liberate capital, and allow banks to 
take full advantage of the LTROs (Altomonte and Busolli, 2014). The announced programme of 
buying unlimited public debt from countries in difficulty in the secondary markets had a significant 
positive effects on the yields of Italy and Spain, with spillovers to the credit market and economic 
growth (Altavilla et al., 2014).  
Since our goal is to study situations of crisis that could give rise to flight to quality and 
contagion, we stop our analysis in early 2013 because yields spread start to decline strongly.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Difference between 10-years government bond yields of Portugal, Greece2 and Ireland 
compared to Germany, in base points (bp), from March 2010 to March 2013, daily data. Source: 
Bloomberg, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The sharp drop in yields on government bonds of Greece, in March 2012, was due to the restructuring of 
Greek debt that consisted of a swap of debt with private creditors (implementation of the PSI-Private Sector 
Involvement). The operation involved the forgiveness of € 100 billion by these investors, reducing the weight of 
the debt.  
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Financial contagion 
Financial contagion has been studied especially in emerging countries’ crises. Currently, due to the 
recent subprime and euro sovereign debt crises and their fast spread to several countries that initially 
had no problems, the contagion of crises became a subject of special interest.    
 Despite the vast literature on the subject, there is no consensus on the definition of financial 
contagion and about the methodology that should be used to test it. Nevertheless, it is generally 
accepted that contagion implies that the links between markets intensify after the occurrence of a 
shock in one market, and thus the collapse of one of them leads to the fall of the others (Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002). This concept cannot be confused with interdependence, which does not imply a 
change in the relationship between markets (Gonzalo and Olmo, 2005).
3
  
The definition of contagion adopted in this work is that contagion is a significant increase in 
co-movements of asset prices across markets, relative to a standard period, conditional on a crisis 
occurring in one market or group of markets (Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003). Consequently, the 
methodology used in this work is based on the calculation of the correlation coefficient, which is 
usually applied by the authors that follow this definition.  
However, in the literature on financial contagion, the authors are divided into two sides 
(Masson, 1999; Pritsker, 2001; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002): those who support the fact that contagion 
exists due to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals in each country and those who argue that 
contagion happens through the action of international investors. On one hand, the former group of 
authors indicate that changes in macroeconomic fundamentals of a country makes it more vulnerable 
in a crisis. The existence of strong trade links between countries in the euro zone and the effect of the 
sovereign debt crisis on the banking system constitute potential channels of contagion (Sachs, 
Tornell and Velasco, 1996).  
On the other hand, the authors that point to international investors as being responsible for 
contagion refer to the existence of behaviors that increase systemic risk, such as “herd behavior”, 
panic or changes in the investor’s sentiment (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The role of predatory 
trading was studied by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005); wealth constraints was analyzed by Kyle 
and Xiong (2001), and portfolio rebalancing was studied by Boyer et al. (2006). In particular, 
portfolio rebalancing is the attempt by investors to adjust their portfolios to changes in the risk of 
each country after the occurrence of shocks removing funds from countries that did not suffer a 
direct shock but that are perceived as affected. The contagion by portfolio rebalancing may occur 
either through flight-to-quality from stocks to bonds or through cross-market rebalancing (involving 
different national markets).  
                                                 
3 In this case there is no contagion because the correlation between markets does not increase.   
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Contagion has been studied in several financial markets, including the bonds market. Caceres and 
Unsal (2013) analyze the yields and volatility of treasury bonds in the Asian market after the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers. The authors conclude that contagion did take place and that the 
overall risk aversion factor had different effects depending on the country: countries such as 
Australia benefitted with the increase in the overall risk (the yields decreased) benefiting from the 
increase in safe-haven flows; while countries such as the Philippines, India and Malaysia were 
penalized and their sovereign bonds yields increased. Finally, the fundamentals of each country had 
an impact on spreads, with spreads increasing, namely when fiscal balances deteriorated.  
During the European sovereign debt crisis, Arezki et al. (2011) find that flight-to-quality can 
explain the variation of CDS spread in response to ratings’ changes. Dajcman (2012) finds that after 
the start of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone, flight-to-quality from stocks to sovereign bonds 
ceased to exist in most of the affected countries.  
Regarding contagion in Eurozone bond markets, Missio and Watzka (2011) use a DCC-
GARCH model to analyze the existence of contagion in a group of 6 euro area countries (Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Austria) during the period of December 31, 2008 to December 
31, 2010. They conclude that there was contagion from Greece to Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
Belgium, in the summer of 2010. However, the authors emphasize the idea that contagion worsened 
country fundamental problems that already existed.  
Likewise, Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and 
Constâncio (2012) show that there was contagion from the Greek sovereign debt crisis to most 
countries of the Monetary Union, mainly to Portugal, Ireland and Spain, countries with weaker 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  In opposition, Pragidis et al. (2015) concludes that there was no 
contagion from Greece to other countries, but instead a decoupling between countries notably 
between Greece and the other PIIGS.  
In conclusion, the existence of contagion from Greece to other peripheral countries is 
confirmed by empirical works and it is justified by the characteristics of the Eurozone: existence of 
countries with weak fundamentals, strong commercial connections, change in expectations about the 
stay of countries in the EMU, the fact that the central bank did not act as lender of last resort, and 
strong dependence between bank risk and sovereign risk. The contagion effect was stronger for the 
GIP group (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), with Ireland showing less structural problems, and Greece 
with the worst situation in terms of public debt and with the largest difficulty in implementing 
recessionary fiscal measures. The flight-to-quality effect, i.e. increase in flows to assets considered a 
safe-haven, should also be noted, because it was identified in Asian economies between 2005 and 
2010.   
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3. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES.  
In this section the hypotheses are introduced, the data are described and the methodology is 
presented. 
 
Data and econometric methodology 
In this work, as is usual in the literature, we use yields
4
 of treasury bonds with 10 years of maturity 
taken from Bloomberg. The data frequency is daily and covers the period from 1 of January 2007 to 
28 of March 2013, except for Ireland’s series that cover the period from 1 November 2007 to 28 of 
March 2013 due the unavailability of previous data. The change in yields was computed as: 
                     
  
    
                                       
(2)                                                    
where    is yield in t. 
   
The contagion of the crisis is usually associated with increased co-movements in the returns of 
financial assets (measured by increased correlation). In this work, we use a bivariate-GARCH model 
(for each pair of countries) in order to model the conditional variance and correlation of the series 
over time. Namely, we use the Dynamic Conditional Correlation – GARCH model (DCC-GARCH) 
(Engle, 2002) that allows us to compute dynamic correlations correcting for heteroskedasticity. This 
model is parsimonious and the correlation matrices estimated are positive definite, the results are 
easy to interpret and the correlation between assets changes over time as required in the study of 
contagion. 
The DCC-GARCH model describes the conditional variance and correlation of various series 
and consists of a non-linear combination of univariate GARCH-models.  According to Naoui, 
Liouane and Brahim (2010) and Missio and Watzka (2011), creating the model goes through two 
steps: first, we estimate the conditional variance of each variable using a univariate ARCH process; 
second, we use the standardized residuals from the completion of the first step to model the 
conditional correlation. Each asset follows a GARCH process: 
 
hi,t=ⱷi + αi e
2 
i,t-1 + βi hi,t-
1                                                                                                                                              (4) 
 
Hereby ht represents the conditional variance, et  the filtered residual with zero mean and ⱷ, α’s 
and β’s the parameters to be estimated. 
                                                 
4 Generic yield: value of the sovereign bond yield that is the benchmark.  
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The residuals are filtered using an ARIMA model in order to eliminate autocorrelation and to get 
zero average. Through the estimation of univariate GARCH models - equation (4), it is possible to 
obtain a matrix of standardized residuals εt  needed to create the DCC-GARCH model. 
In a DCC(1,1) model, the dynamic covariance is estimated according to the following 
equation
5
: 
 
Qt=(1- α - β) Ô + αεt-1 ε't-1 + βQt-
1                                                                                                                          (6) 
                                                                                         
 Qt is the time-varying covariance matrix of the standardized residuals εt  resulting from the 
univariate GARCH equation; Ô is the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized residuals; 
the α’s and the β’s are parameters to be estimated by the DCC model, being non-negative scalars 
and α + β < 1. More precisely, the α’s represent the reaction of the covariance to past shocks and the 
β’s represent the reaction of the covariance to the previous covariance. 
The unconditional covariance matrix Ô is positive definite and past shocks (εt-1 ε't-1) are 
positive semidefinite, therefore also Qt will be positive definite, because it is an weighted average of 
a positive definite matrix and a positive semidefinite matrix.   
The normalization of equation (6) is then done to arrive at the dynamic correlation matrices 
Rt:  
 
Rt = Q*t
-1 
Qt Q*t
-1                                                                                                                                                     
(7) 
 
 
Where Q*t is a diagonal matrix with the square roots of the diagonal of Qt as diagonal elements. The 
elements of Rt  will be ρijt = qijt / √(qiiqjj), ρijt is the correlation coefficient between two assets, with the 
diagonal of Rt  containing the correlation coefficients of an asset with itself, that is 1. Rt allows us to 
derive the dynamic conditional correlation to test our hypotheses.  
The covariance matrix of filtered residuals (and not standardized) that vary over time is derived 
according to equation (8):   
Ht= DtRtDt                                                                                                                                                                              
(8) 
                                                 
5 The DCC model can be generalized in order to have more lags of Q or more lags of the cross product of 
errors.  
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Where Ht is the covariance matrix; Dt is the diagonal matrix of standard deviations time variant, i.e. 
Dt = diag(h11t
1/2
,..., hnnt
1/2
) and each hiit is the conditional variance described as a univariate GARCH 
model (equation (4)). 
6
  
As an illustration of the model, take the DCC – GARCH (1,1) for Portugal and Greece:   
 
rGR,t= γGR+ eGR,t  
rPT,t= γPT + ePT,t                                                                                                                                                                                    
hGR,t = ⱷGR + αGR * e
2
GR,
 
t-1 + βGR  * hGR,t-1                    
hPT,t = ⱷPT + αPT * e
2
PT,
 
t-1 + βPT * hPT,t-1                    
QDCC,t = (1- αDCC - βDCC) * Ô + αDCC*εt-1 ε't-1 + βDCC*Qt-1 
  
 
 
Contagion and flight-to-quality test  
In order to test contagion and flight-to-quality we look at changes in the correlation between bond 
markets as in Baur and Lucey (2009), which study the co-movement between the bond market and 
the stock market in the same country. According to these authors, there is evidence of contagion 
when the correlation coefficient between both markets has a significant increase in a crisis period, 
relative to a benchmark period of normality, and with a positive coefficient. Flight-to-quality occurs 
when there is a significant decrease in the correlation coefficient in a crisis period, and it assumes 
negative values. When the study is conducted on the relationship between the stock and the bond 
market, flight-to-quality means a movement of flows from stocks to bonds. In our case, since we are 
studying only the bond market there is flight-to-quality from the market where losses are more 
pronounced (the market in crisis) to the market where losses are smaller or non- existent (Table 1).  
 
 
                                                 
6 GARCH-Multivariate model was estimated using RATSS 8.0 program.  
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Table 1 –  
Interpretation of correlation coefficient between bond market A and bond market B. 
 
Situation 
Larger 
decline in 
market A 
Larger 
decline in 
market B 
Coefficient is positive, varies 
positively and stays positive 
Contagion 
Coefficient is positive, varies 
negatively and stays positive. 
Nothing takes place 
Coefficient is positive, varies 
negatively and becomes negative. 
Flight to 
market B 
Flight to 
market A 
Coefficient is negative, varies 
positively and stays negative. 
Nothing takes place 
Coefficient is negative varies 
negatively and stays negative. 
Flight to 
market B 
Flight to 
market A 
Coefficient is negative, varies 
positively and becomes positive. 
Contagion 
  
This methodology demands the definition of the crises periods. The crises periods are identified 
according to the behavior of the Portuguese, Greek and Irish bond markets. A crisis period is 
identified when there are at least two days in three weeks or less where the daily changes in yields 
are larger than 1.65 times the returns’ standard deviation of the total sample (which corresponds to 
less than 5% probability of occurrence in a normal distribution). When there is a case with the same 
characteristics in less than ten days it means that the crisis is prolonged. The rule “at least two days 
in three weeks” was the one that best identified the crisis periods according to the prior knowledge 
that we have of the major crises periods. In order to calculate the change in the correlation in the 
crisis period we need a benchmark period, which is defined as thirty days prior to the crisis.   
The existence of contagion between the Portuguese and the Greek bond markets, and the 
Portuguese and Irish bond markets are the first and the second hypotheses to test, respectively. The 
existence of flows of flight-to-quality from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German 
bond market are the third and fourth hypotheses to test. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Preliminary Analysis and definition of the crisis periods to be studied  
First, we confirmed that the series of returns are stationary using the ADF test (See Table A1).
7
 Next, 
using the methodology described above, we estimated for each series (of the first differences of 
yields) the most appropriate ARIMA model using the Schwarz criterion. The autocorrelation in each 
series was eliminated (Table A2 in the appendix) with an ARMA model (12,4) for Portugal 
8
, an 
ARMA (6,8) 
9
 for Greece, an AR (1) model for Ireland and an AR (3) for Germany. The residuals of 
these models are the ones used in the multivariate GARCH and denominated filtered residuals.  
Using the methodology described in the previous chapter, we identified 12 crisis periods for 
the Portuguese bond market and 10 periods for the Greek bond market, from January 2007 to March 
2013. A total of 18 crises periods in both markets were studied. For the cases in which there is a 
crisis in both countries, the longer crisis was considered. In what concerns the relationship between 
the Portuguese and Irish markets, only two crises periods originated in the Irish market.  
In what follows, firstly we assess the hypothesis making a graphic and qualitative analysis on 
the evolution of the correlations throughout the analyzed periods. We study the tendency of the 
correlation over long periods, looking for relevant evidence to test the hypotheses, namely to analyse 
the decoupling between Greece and Portugal. Secondly we carried out a more detailed analysis for 
the identified crisis periods to test for the existence of contagion or flight-to-quality.  
 
Portugal and Greece 
The objective here is to find out whether there was contagion between the Portuguese and Greek 
markets. In order to obtain the correlation, we used the model DCC - IGARCH. An integrated model 
was used due to the fact that the sum of conditional variances coefficients of the GARCH model 
were higher than 1. We performed tests for the absence of ARCH effects, no autocorrelation and 
normality of residuals (Table A3). Only the normality assumption was rejected, and thus a 
multivariate student distribution was used with the estimated degrees of freedom. 
10
 
                                                 
7 These results were confirmed using the Phillips-Perron and the KPSS tests.  
8 The autoregressive terms from -2 to -5 and from -7 to -11 and the moving-average terms from -1 to -3 were 
not significant and were removed.  
9 The autoregressive terms -1, -4 and -5 and the moving-average terms from -2 to -7 were not significant and 
were removed.  
10 In all the below models we use IGARCH and the student distribution for the same reason.  
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Figure 3 - 10-years Portuguese and Greek government bond yields, as a percentage. Source: Bloomberg, 
2013. 
 
Until the Subprime Crisis (Q4 2008) the 10-year Portuguese and Greek government bonds yields 
were very similar (Figure 3) and the correlation between both series was close to 1 (Figure 4). From 
the Subprime Crisis onwards there is a downward tendency in the correlation, that however stays 
positive, and the yields also became more distant from each other. It is important to highlight the 
significant increase in the correlation after the Financial Assistance Program enforcement in Portugal 
(April 2011). This increase occurred together with the increase in yields in both markets, which 
brings the evidence of contagion with risk premium increasing for both countries.  
 From August 2011 to the end of that year, there was a decrease in the correlation, reaching -
0.25, indicating a decoupling of the Greek and Portuguese situations. Later in 2012, the correlation 
grew again after having been negative at the beginning of the year. Yields also increase for both 
countries, but with a greater increase for the Greek bonds. In the beginning of 2013, the correlation 
fell sharply. This fall was interrupted by the crisis in Cyprus. Therefore, evidence does not confirm 
the news of an existing decoupling in both bond markets up to March 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
PT GR
Flight-to-quality and contagion in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis:  
The cases of Portugal and Greece 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
17 
 
Figure 4 - Correlation between 10-year Portuguese and Greek bonds (IGARCH-DCC(1,1) 
Model). 
 
 
 
Turning now to the hypothesis of contagion during the crisis periods, we performed a more detailed 
analysis of the correlation between the two markets, studying the 18 identified periods in both bond 
markets (Table 2). There was contagion in 11 of those periods (61% of the crisis episodes). In all 
main crises episodes – subprime, crisis in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus – we found evidence of 
contagion.  
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Table 2 - Identified Crises in the Portuguese and Greece markets. 
Cause Period 
Number 
of crisis 
days 
Number 
of days 
with 
market 
stress 
Yields 
change in 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
before the 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
during the 
crisis 
period 
Results 
Subprime I 
04-12-2008 to 
08-12-2008 
3 2 
0.0661 
(PT11) 
0.8418 0.8512 Contagion 
Subprime II 
06-01-2009 to 
22-01-2009 
13 3 
0.1670 
(PT) 
0.7463 0.7206 
Nothing 
takes place 
 Downgrade of 
Greek rating 
(Note 1) 
09-12-2009 to 
15-12-2009 
5 2 
0.0680 
(GR12) 
0.7493 0.6343 
Nothing 
takes place 
Maintenance 
of the negative 
outlook for 
Portuguese 
rating (Note 2)  
27-01-2010 to 
03-02-2010 
6 3 
0.1008 (PT) 
0.1417 (GR) 
0.6607 0.7911 Contagion 
Sovereign 
debt crisis in 
Greece 
06-04-2010 to 
14-05-2010 
29 
8 
 
0.8086 
(GR) 
0.4700 0.6040 Contagion 
Markets 
instability 
(Greek crisis) 
(Note 3) 
15-06-2010 to 
23-06-2010 
7 2 
0.2359 
(GR) 
0.6072 0.6997 Contagion 
Markets 
instability 
related to 
Ireland (Note 
4) 
16-09-2010 to 
20-09-2010 
3 2 
0.1060 
(PT) 
0.5691 0.4973 
Nothing 
takes place 
Sovereign 
debt crisis in 
Ireland 
27-10-2010 to 
10-11-2010 
11 4 
0.2432 
(PT) 
0.4105 0.4511 Contagion 
Downgrade of 
Greek rating 
to non-
investment 
grade (Note 5) 
06-01-2011 to 
18-01-2011 
9 2 
0.0607 
(PT) 
0.4747 0.3669 
Nothing 
takes place 
Markets 
instability 
related to 
Portugal (Note 
6) 
18-04-2011 to 
27-04-2011 
8 2 
0.1667 
(GR) 
0.3487 0.4879 Contagion 
Sovereign 
debt crisis in 
Portugal 
06-07-2011 to 
11-07-2011 
4 2 
0.1978 
(PT) 
0.3744 0.3836 Contagion 
 
                                                 
11 PT: Crisis identified in the Portuguese sovereign bond market.  
12 GR: Crisis identified in the  Greek sovereign bond market. 
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Table 3 - Identified Crises in the Portuguese and Greece markets (continuation) 
Cause Period Number 
of crisis 
days 
Number 
of days 
with 
market 
stress 
Yields 
change in 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
before the 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
during the 
crisis 
period 
Results 
Downgrade of 
Italian rating 
(Note 7) 
05-09-2011 to 
20-09-2011 
12 2 
0.1333 
(PT) 
0.5535 
0.5698 
 
Contagion 
Markets 
instability 
related to 
Greece (Note 8) 
26-10-2011 to 
01-11-2011 
5 2 
0.0243 
(GR) 
0.3194 0.2027 
Nothing 
takes place 
Political 
instability in 
Spain and Italy 
24-11-2011 to 
30-11-2011 
5 4 
0.2350 
(PT) 
0.1617 0.2919 Contagion 
Rating 
downgrade of 
several 
countries (Note 
9) 
16-01-2012 to 
30-01-2012 
11 2 
0.3696 
(PT) 
-0.1370 -0.0659 
Nothing 
takes place 
Granting of 
second 
international 
aid package to 
Greece. 
22-03-2012 to 
23-03-2012 
2 2 
0.1071 
(GR) 
0.0199 -0.2983 
Flight to 
Portuguese 
market 
Instability 
related to 
Greece and 
Spain (Note 10) 
04-05-2012 to 
18-05-2012 
11 2 
0.1357 
(PT) 
0.0397 0.1559 Contagion 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in Cyprus 
19-03-2013 to 
27-03-2013 
7 2 
0.1344 
(GR) 
0.4303 0.6136 Contagion 
Note: 
- No. of days with stress: no. of days in which the yields variance exceeded the standard deviation of the series 
times 1.65.  
- Yields variation in the crises period: proportional change in yields accumulated during the period. (using a 
geometric average);  
- Correlation between the crisis periods: the average correlation 30 days before the start of the period. 
- Correlation during the crisis period: average correlation during the crisis period. 
Note on the cause of crisis periods: 
1- Rating agencies Fitch and Standard & Poor´s (S&P) downgraded Greek sovereign debt; 2 - Fitch 
declares it would keep the negative outlook for Portuguese sovereign debt, also stating that a 
downgrading would be more likely to happen. The Portuguese Treasury and Public Debt Agency 
(IGCP) had difficulties in issuing debt; 3- Market instability associated to Greek sovereign debt crisis; 
4- Ireland´s central bank announced that the cost of the bailout of Anglo Irish Bank (nationalized by 
the Irish government in January 2009) could reach €34.3 bn. This situation would push the budget 
deficit to 32% of GDP.  Investors also had concerns regarding Portugal’s public accounts; 5 – Rating 
agency Fitch downgrades the rating of Greek sovereign debt to non-investment grade, with negative 
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outlook, making it equivalent to the rating assigned by the agencies S&P and Moody´s; 6- Market 
instability related to the request for economic and financial assistance programme by Portugal; 7 – 
Rating downgrade of Italian sovereign debt by S&P with negative outlook; 8 – Instability related to 
the program of financial assistance to Greece; 9 – Rating downgrades by the agency S&P of the 
sovereign debt of 9 euro area countries, including Portugal, that became non-investment grade by the 
three major rating agencies; 10 – Political instability in Greece; bailout request by the fourth largest 
Spanish bank (Bankia). 
 
Portugal and Ireland 
In order to see if the existence of contagion is a phenomenon specific to Portugal and Greece, the countries 
which were most affected by the crisis, we also studied the relationship between the sovereign bond markets 
of Portugal and Ireland.  
Starting with the graphical and qualitative analysis of the correlation between both markets and 
observing yields series in  
Figure 5, it is possible to see that yields are relatively close until the Irish demand for external 
intervention (November 2010), Portuguese yields being slightly lower. After this, Irish yields grew rapidly, 
with the Portuguese ones meeting them in April 2011. After that date, the Irish yields began to decline, 
while Portuguese yields kept growing. 
According to
 
the correlation between both markets obtained with the DCC-IGARCH (1,1) model  
(Bloomberg, 2013. Figure 6), it can be observed that the correlation is always positive (except in May 
2012). One can also say that the correlation has a downward tendency until the end of 2011, when a new but 
undefined tendency starts. It is important to mention  that, after the Irish intervention, in November 2010, 
there is a strong drop in the Portuguese and Irish yields’ correlation.  
Figure 5- Portuguese and Irish 10-year Government Bonds Yields, in percent. Source:  
.  
Bloomberg, 2013. 
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Figure 6 - Correlation Portugal-Ireland (IGARCH-DCC(1,1) Model). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2013, correlation grew in parallel with a decline in the yields of both countries. During this period, 
there was a perception, among investors, that Portugal was following Ireland on the way to recovery, 
stepping away from Greece. In March 2013, the correlation fell again despite staying positive, most 
likely due to difficulties in the negotiation of the Cyprus rescue plan. It is important to remember that 
during this period, there was an increase in the correlation between Portugal and Greece (see above), 
which might indicate that Portugal was getting closer to Greece rather than to Ireland. 
In a more detailed analysis, studying the identified crisis periods in the Portuguese and Irish 
markets, contagion was found in 6 of the 12 crisis periods, that is, 50% of the periods (Table 4). 
During the main episodes of crisis (Subprime, Greece, Ireland and Portugal crises), only in the Greek 
Crisis was there contagion. This confirms the results present in the literature about the existence of 
contagion between Greece, Portugal and Ireland, but the market perceives the distance between the 
Irish and Portuguese case as being larger than between the Greek and Portuguese one.  
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Table 4 - Identified Crises in the Portuguese and Irish markets. (Notes on crisis periods: see Table 2) 
Cause Period 
Number 
of crisis 
days 
Number 
of days 
with 
market 
stress 
Yields 
change in 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
before the 
crisis period 
Correlation 
during the 
crisis period 
Results 
Subprime I 
 
04-12-2008 to 
08-12-2008 
3 2 
0.0661 
(PT13) 
0.8687 0.8271 
Nothing 
takes 
place 
Subprime II 
06-01-2009 to 
22-01-2009 
13 3 
0.1671 
(PT) 
0.8650 0.8512 
Nothing 
takes 
place 
Maintenance of 
the negative 
outlook for 
Portuguese 
rating  (Note2) 
28-01-2010 to 
03-02-2010 
5 2 
0.1008 
(PT) 
0.7430 0.7674 Contagion 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece 
22-04-2010 to 
06-05-2010 
11 6 
0.2677 
(PT) 
0.6271 0.7843 Contagion 
Market 
instability related 
to Ireland 
(Note4) 
25-08-2010 to 
23-09-2010 
22 
 
5 
0.2012 
(IR14) 
0.7248 0.7773 Contagion 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in Ireland 
19-10-2010 to 
24-11-2010 
27 11 
0.4543 
(IR) 
0.7562 0.7256 
Nothing 
takes 
place 
Greek debt was 
downgraded to a 
non-investment 
rating (Note5) 
06-01-2011 to 
18-01-2011 
9 2 
0.0607 
(PT) 
0.7436 0.5717 
Nothing 
takes 
place 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in  Portugal 
06-07-2011 to 
11-07-2011 
4 2 
0.1977 
(PT) 
0.3583 0.2495 
Nothing 
takes 
place 
Italian debt was 
downgraded 
(Note7) 
05-09-2011 to 
20-09-2011 
12 2 
0.1333 
(PT) 
0.3797 0.3815 Contagion 
Political 
instability in 
Spain and Italy 
24-11-2011 to 
30-11-2011 
5 4 
0.2350 
(PT) 
0.3224 0.4078 Contagion 
Rating 
downgrading of 
several countries 
(Note9) 
16-01-2012 to 
30-01-2012 
11 2 
0.3696 
(PT) 
0.2621 0.4368 Contagion 
Instability 
related to Greece 
and Spain  
(Note10) 
04-05-2012 to 
18-05-2012 
11 2 
0.1357 
(PT) 
0.1865 0.0786 
Nothing 
takes 
place 
                                                 
13 PT: Crisis identified on Portuguese sovereign bond market. 
14 IR: Crisis identified on Irish sovereign bond market. 
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Portugal and Germany 
Now we turn to the relationship between the German and Portuguese government bond markets. The 
aim is to test whether there was evidence of fight-to-quality from Portugal to Germany. According to 
the result we got from the DCC-IGARCH model, the correlation between 10-year German and 
Portuguese government bonds yields (Figure 8) is close to 1 from 2007 to Q2 2008, declining 
strongly thereafter due to the Subprime crisis. The same picture is obtained by analysing the levels of 
the yields, which were very similar in both countries until September 2008 (Figure 7). By the end of 
2009, the correlation between the two markets was close to zero, becoming negative with the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis in early 2010, which ended up creating the need for external intervention on 
April 23
rd
 2010. It is at the end of 2009 that the yields of both countries started to diverge, with the 
Portuguese yields reaching more than 16%, while the German ones decreasing to values close to 1%. 
Between November 2009 and April 2010, the correlation dramatically declined from 0.8 to -0.7. 
From that period on, the correlation oscillated between positive and negative values, being negative 
most of the time. Observing Figure 7, where we have the Portuguese and German yields, from 2010 
to 2012, one can verify that the yields were moving in opposite directions to each other during most 
of this time, with German yields declining while the Portuguese ones were growing. This translates 
into the higher demand for low risk bonds due to the increase in risk aversion during the Euro 
sovereign debt crisis.  
Figure 7- Portuguese (right side scale) and German 10-year government bonds yields, in percent. 
Source: Bloomberg, 2013. 
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Taking into account when  external intervention formally started in Portugal (April, 6
th
 2011) and 
when its rating was considered at non-investment grade by the three main rating agencies (January 
2012) – two paradigmatic periods of the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis – we reach  the conclusion, 
observing Figure 8, that there was a decrease in the correlation, going from positive to negative. This 
suggests the occurrence of the flight-to-quality phenomenon in both periods. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Correlation Portugal - Germany (IGARCH-DCC(1,1) Model). 
 
A deeper analysis of the crisis periods shows (Table 5) evidence of flight-to-quality from the 
Portuguese to the German market in 8 of the 12 identified crisis periods for the Portuguese market 
(2/3 of the periods). It is important to point out that in one of the periods where there is no evidence 
of flight-to-quality, it is directly related to the sovereign debt crisis of the whole Eurozone. 
Moreover, the existence of contagion occurs only in crisis episodes not directly related to Portugal. 
This indicates that the crisis in Portugal did not impose a systemic risk for the Eurozone and 
Germany.   
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Table 5 - Identified crisis for the Portuguese government bond market. 
Cause Period 
Number of 
crisis days 
Number 
of days 
with 
market 
stress 
Yields 
change in 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
before the 
crisis period 
Correlation 
during the 
crisis period 
Results 
Subprime I 
 
04-12-2008 
to 08-12-
2008 
3 2 0.0661 0.7666 0.8678 Contagion 
Subprime II 
06-01-2009 
to 22-01-
2009 
13 3 0.1671 0.8795 0.7508 
Nothing 
takes place 
Maintenance 
of negative 
outlook for 
Portuguese 
rating (Note2) 
28-01-2010 
to 03-02-
2010 
5 2 0.1009 0.2585 -0.0303 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece 
22-04-2010 
to 06-05-
2010 
11 6 0.2678 0.2188 -0.4108 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Market 
instability 
related to 
Ireland (Note4) 
16-09-2010 
to 20-09-
2010 
3 2 0.1060 0.0169 0.1552 Contagion 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in 
Ireland 
27-10-2010 
to 10-11-
2010 
11 4 0.2432 0.0571 -0.0124 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Greek debt 
was 
downgraded to 
a non-
investment 
rating  (Note5) 
06-01-2011 
to 18-01-
2011 
9 2 0.0607 -0.1067 -0.1382 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Sovereign debt 
crisis in 
Portugal 
06-07-2011 
to 11-07-
2011 
4 2 0.1978 -0.1523 -0.3122 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Italian debt 
was 
downgraded 
(Note7) 
05-09-2011 
to 20-09-
2011 
12 2 0.1334 -0.0922 -0.1366 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Political 
instability in 
Spain and Italy 
24-11-2011 
to 30-11-
2011 
5 4 0.2350 
0.0300 
 
0.2498 Contagion 
Rating 
downgrading 
of several 
countries 
(Note9) 
16-01-2012 
to 30-01-
2012 
11 2 0.3696 0.1005 -0.0247 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Instability 
related to 
Greece and 
Spain (Note10) 
04-05-2012 
to 18-05-
2012 
11 2 0.1357 0.0106 -0.0830 
Flight to 
German 
market 
    Notes on crisis periods: see Table 2.   
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Greece and Germany 
Now, a similar analysis is undertaken of the Greek and German markets during the crisis periods 
identified for the Greek market. Observing the yields (Figure 9), we can see that it is the subprime 
crisis at the end of 2008 that causes markets to diverge. Correlations (Figure 10) computed through 
the econometric DCC – IGARCH (1,1) model show that the values are close to 1 from 2007 to Q2 
2008. We also observe evidence of flight-to-quality at the end of 2009, with correlation shifting from 
positive to negative values, such as in the Portugal-Germany case, assuming values even more 
negative in early 2010, when the IMF-EU program for Greece was initiated. It is interesting to notice 
that this large fall in correlation between Portugal and Germany and Greece and Germany occurred 
at the end of 2009. In November and December 2009, incorrect practices were identified in Greece 
revealing the true value of the Government Debt, which caused an immediate downgrading of Greek 
bonds into non-investment grade. It is also important to note that from this date onwards, the 
correlations between the Portuguese and German bond markets and the Greek and German bond 
markets were negative for most of the time. However, the Greek rescue plan led to a short-run 
increase in the correlation with Germany. The same benign effect is observed for Portugal (with an 
increase in the correlation with Germany and mostly a decrease in the correlation with Greece) and 
for Ireland (with a decrease in the correlation with Portugal). 
 
Figure 9- German (right side scale) and Greek 10-year government bonds yields, in percent. 
Source: Bloomberg, 2013. 
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Figure 10 - Correlação Grécia-Alemanha (Modelo IGARCH-DCC(1,1)). 
 
 
 
It is important to note that during the sharp drop of the correlation in 2013 (and since September 
2012), the yields increased in the Greek market and decreased in the German market, which is 
indicative of an increasing risk aversion. This behavior is also verified, but with less intensity, in the 
Portuguese market. In any case, the decrease in the correlation between the two peripheral countries 
and Germany could be an indicator that the European market for government bonds was far from 
reaching stability in March 2013.  
A deeper analysis of  the correlation between the Greek and German markets allows us to 
point out evidence of flight-to-quality in 7 of the 10 identified periods of crisis (in 70% of the 
periods) (Table 6).  
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Table 6- Identified Crisis for the Greek Bond market. 
Cause Period 
Number 
of crisis 
days 
Number 
of days 
with 
market 
stress 
Yields 
change 
in crisis 
period 
Correlation 
before the 
crisis 
period 
Correlation 
during the 
crisis 
period 
Results 
Downgrading 
of Greek 
rating (Note 
1) 
09-12-2009 to 
15-12-2009 
5 2 0.0680 0.5112 -0.2285 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Maintenance 
of negative 
outlook for 
Portuguese 
rating 
(Note2) 
27-01-2010 to 
28-01-2010 
2 2 0.1418 -0.1242 -0.1982 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Sovereign 
debt crisis in 
Greece 
06-04-2010 to 
14-05-2010 
29 8 0.8087 -0.0657 -0.2523 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Market 
instability 
related to 
Greece 
(Note3) 
15-06-2010 to 
23-06-2010 
7 2 0.2359 -0.3508 0.0327 Contagion 
Market 
instability 
related to 
Portugal 
(Note6) 
18-04-2011 to 
27-04-2011 
8 2 0.1667 0.0291 -0.5383 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Downgrading 
of Italian 
rating 
(Note7) 
05-09-2011 to 
19-09-2011 
11 4 0.2270 -0.0677 -0.2364 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Market 
instability 
related to 
Greece 
(Note8) 
26-10-2011 to 
01-11-2011 
5 2 0.0243 -0.1540 -0.2185 
Flight to 
German 
market 
The second 
program of 
external help 
to Greece.  
22-03-2012 to 
23-03-2012 
2 2 0.1071 -0.1719 -0.0854 
Nothing 
takes place 
Instability 
related to 
Greece and 
Spain 
(Note10) 
07-05-2012 to 
15-05-2012 
7 3 0.4095 -0.2660 0.0309 Contagion 
Sovereign 
debt crisis in 
Cyprus 
19-03-2013 to 
27-03-2013 
7 2 0.1344 -0.4929 -0.7137 
Flight to 
German 
market 
Notes on crisis periods: see Table 2.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on contagion during the European sovereign debt crisis, 
focusing on Portugal and Greece. Its main innovative points are the study on contagion during 
periods of particular market stress, and the assessment of flight-to quality to the German market. Our 
results show, that in most of the crisis periods there is contagion between peripheral countries 
(Portugal-Ireland and mostly Portugal-Greece). In contrast, in the majority of the crises identified 
there was evidence of flight-to-quality from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German 
one. 
On the contrary to financial news, we do not confirm decoupling between the Portuguese 
bond market and the Greek bond market until early 2013. In what concerns the relationship between 
the Portuguese and Irish bond markets, from May 2012 there was an upward trend in the correlation, 
albeit with significant fluctuations, this increase in correlation being weaker than the increase in the 
correlation between Greece and Portugal. This is a sign that a significant coupling between Portugal 
and Ireland did not exist. 
We also observe that the major structural break in the correlation between Portugal and 
Germany, and Greece and Germany was between the end of 2009 and May 2010, i.e. between the 
discovery of the true values of the Greek debt and the approval of the Greek rescue plan. This shows 
the importance of the Greek episode at the beginning of the euro sovereign debt crisis. 
In terms of economic policy, the existence of contagion in the majority of the crisis periods 
identified highlights the importance of governments and central banks to act promptly to avoid the 
worsening of the situation. According to Missio and Watzka (2011), with evidence of contagion, the 
requests for external assistance conducted in several euro area countries were a reasonable decision 
by governments. Constâncio (2012) also mentions the great importance of the role of central banks 
to contain the financial contagion. Afonso, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Constâncio (2012) 
point out that the solution to the crisis has to be on the substantial improvement of the countries 
fundamentals, in articulation with other measures to contain contagion. 
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7. APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 – Output of unit root test (ADF test) of the 10-year bond yields series of Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland and Germany 
  
 
P-Value, 
Series in 
levels 
Result 
P-Value, 
Series in 1
st 
differences 
Result 
Portugal 0.6333 
Non 
stationary 
0.0000 stationary 
Greece 0.5579 
Non 
stationary 
0.0000 stationary 
Ireland 0.5622 
Non 
stationary 
0.0000 stationary 
Germany 0.8829 
Non 
stationary 
0.0000 stationary 
 
 
 
Table A2 – Output of autocorrelation tests of the 10-years bond yields series, using Eviews. 
 
Series Q(10) stat. P-value 
Portugal 14.975 0.092 
Greece 4.3555 0.824 
Ireland 5.9759 0.817 
Gernany 14.825 0.139 
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Table A3 – Test on no ARCH effects, no autocorrelation, and normality of residuals. 
 
Countries 
ARCH Test 
(multivariate) 
p-value of 
estat. χ2 
Autocorrelation 
Test (univariate) 
p-value of estat. 
Ljung Box lag 
(40) 
Normality Test 
(univariate) 
p-value of Jarque 
Bera statistics 
Portugal and 
Greece 0.9974 
PT: 0.2234 
GR: 0.2352 
PT: 0 
GR: 0 
Portugal and 
Ireland 0.9944 
PT: 0.4189 
IE: 0.2647 
PT: 0 
IR: 0 
Portugal and 
Germany 0.1582 
PT: 0.3425 
DE: 0.4182 
PT: 0 
AL: 0 
Greece and 
Germany 0.4816 
GR: 0.2289 
DE: 0.4223 
GR: 0 
AL: 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
